Interface interference · European Union

Preselection and defaults

Preselection sets a choice before the user actively makes it. Defaults can reduce effort and are not inherently unlawful, but EU rules expressly restrict some pre-ticked extra payments and require valid consent in relevant data contexts. Risk rises when a default adds cost, sharing or commitment and the alternative is hard to notice or select.

Current law
Also known as
  • default bias
  • pre-ticked choice
  • default-on setting
  • bad defaults
  • default add-on
  • deceptive snugness

Definition

What is this pattern?

A business-favoured option with a plausible adverse consequence is active before a deliberate user choice. The label describes a recurring design mechanism; whether a particular implementation is harmful or unlawful depends on the complete journey, audience, evidence and rules within scope.

How it works

A business-favoured option with a plausible adverse consequence is active before a deliberate user choice. The system chooses a consequential option before the user acts, allowing inattention or momentum to preserve a paid, data-sharing or longer-term state.

Warning signs

  • The state is selected at first relevant presentation.
  • The default benefits the business or increases cost, data use, tracking or commitment.
  • The user must act to avoid the consequence.

Potential harms

  • The shopper may pay for an add-on through inattention rather than active agreement.
  • A user may commit to a larger upfront payment without making an active billing-period choice.

Learn by comparison

What does this look like?

These fictional examples make the design mechanism easier to recognise. They do not depict a real company and do not establish that an individual interface is unlawful.

Illustrative example 1 · Electronics checkout

A fictional retailer preselects a €12 protection plan and includes it in the total before the shopper has made a distinct choice.

Potential consumer harm: The shopper may pay for an add-on through inattention rather than active agreement.

Illustrative example 2 · Streaming plan selection

A fictional streaming service opens with the annual plan selected and highlights a monthly-equivalent figure while the payable annual total is smaller.

Potential consumer harm: A user may commit to a larger upfront payment without making an active billing-period choice.

Illustrative example 3 · Ticket checkout

A paid cancellation-protection add-on is pre-ticked in the order summary and must be removed through a small control away from the displayed total.

Potential consumer harm: The buyer may pay for an optional extra without making an express, informed selection.

Illustrative example 4 · Account settings

A new sharing feature is enabled by default and the off setting is placed in a separate advanced-settings area with no explanation during rollout.

Potential consumer harm: People may disclose information or adopt a setting they would not have actively chosen.

What is a fairer alternative?

Use a neutral initial state for optional payments or consent-dependent choices and require an affirmative selection. For convenience defaults that are permitted, explain the effect, provide a nearby alternative and make later reversal straightforward.

Context matters

Context and boundary cases

  • The state is selected at first relevant presentation.
  • The default benefits the business or increases cost, data use, tracking or commitment.
  • The user must act to avoid the consequence.
  • Exclude or qualify the label where consumer-protective or neutral default.
  • Exclude or qualify the label where state restored from a prior explicit user choice.

When a similar design can serve a legitimate purpose

  • A similar design should not be classified this way where consumer-protective or neutral default.
  • A similar design should not be classified this way where state restored from a prior explicit user choice.

Operational review

What teams should review

Teams
  • Product
  • UX
  • Legal
  • Engineering
  • Content design
  1. Do “Protection included” and “Add protection for €12” receive comparable prominence and explain their consequences before activation?
  2. Compare the basket before and after the action, including total and line items; does the mutation satisfy “The state is selected at first relevant presentation”?
  3. What neutral rendering or comprehension result would falsify the classification, particularly in light of “Consumer-protective or neutral default”?
  4. Do “Annual selected” and “Select monthly or annual” receive comparable prominence and explain their consequences before activation?
  5. Capture every peer option, its default state and visual prominence; do those states support “The default benefits the business or increases cost, data use, tracking or commitment”?
  6. What neutral rendering or comprehension result would falsify the classification, particularly in light of “state restored from a prior explicit user choice”?
  7. Which complete journey evidence supports or contradicts the preselection or bad default classification?

Evidence to retain

  • Versioned captures of the Checkout and Subscription states before, during and after the relevant decision
  • Configuration, content and event records supporting the observed preselection or bad default mechanism
  • Responsive, keyboard and assistive-technology review of every material option and consequence
  • Price-component, offer-version and calculation records linked to the captured screen
  • Control defaults, validation rules and consent or selection state changes

Legal map and implementation tools

Evidence base

Sources

  1. Dark commercial patternsOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development · Secondary · checked 2026-09-14 · OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 336
  2. Unfair Commercial Practices DirectiveEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Directive 2005/29/EC; CELEX 02005L0029-20220528
  3. Consumer Rights DirectiveEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Directive 2011/83/EU; CELEX 02011L0083-20220528
  4. General Data Protection RegulationEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Regulation (EU) 2016/679; CELEX 32016R0679
  5. Digital Services ActEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Regulation (EU) 2022/2065; CELEX 32022R2065
  6. Digital Markets ActEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Regulation (EU) 2022/1925; CELEX 32022R1925
  7. Behavioural study on unfair commercial practices in the digital environmentEuropean Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers · Secondary · checked 2026-09-14 · DOI 10.2838/859030; ISBN 978-92-76-52316-1
  8. Review of EU consumer lawEuropean Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers · Primary · checked 2026-09-14
  9. 2030 Consumer Agenda and action plan for consumers in the Single MarketEuropean Commission · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · COM(2025) 848 final; CELEX 52025DC0848
  10. Digital Fairness Act: call for evidence for an impact assessmentEuropean Commission · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Initiative 14622; Ares(2025)6275573
  11. Digital Fairness Act: factual summary report of the public consultationEuropean Commission · Primary · checked 2026-08-09 · Ares(2025)11434262
  12. Commission work programme 2026: Europe's Independence MomentEuropean Commission · Primary · checked 2026-09-14 · COM(2025) 870 final; CELEX 52025DC0870; Annex I item 30